Political protests are almost always collective endeavours, in which many people come together to jointly express some claim or demand. The power of those protests lies, in part, in their collectivity. But this collectivity also means that we may end up protesting alongside others who, though they endorse the shared claim the protest is expressing, also make other claims which are deeply unjust or harmful during the protest. This paper explores whether protesting alongside such others makes one complicit in the promotion or expression of those unjust or harmful claims, and whether we therefore have a duty not to participate (or to cease ongoing participation) in such protests. I identify two moral risks involved in protest which may ground such a duty – that we inadvertently amplify those views, and that we are unable to engage in effective counterspeech in response to them – and submit that when these risks are especially high, protestors have a pro tanto duty not to participate. However, I also show that the resources provided by different organisational forms protestors may use can help mitigate these risks.
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Alexander Bryan (2026) studied this question.
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