Constitutionally Bounded Sequential Incrementalism: Criminal Justice Reform and Prosecutorial Governance in Comparative Perspective

This study explains why criminal justice and prosecutorial reform often proceeds through gradual institutional adjustment rather than radical replacement despite severe politicization and legitimacy crises. Drawing on historical institutionalism, comparative judicial politics, legitimacy research, and prosecutorial-governance scholarship, it develops the concept of “constitutionally bounded sequential incrementalism,” in which constitutional constraints, bureaucratic embeddedness, and professional authority channel reform pressure into sequential layering and conversion. South Korea is the primary case, examined through comparative historical analysis and process tracing, with the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, the United States, and Italy as structured reference cases. A brief Latin American comparison clarifies the concept’s scope conditions. The analysis shows that politicization increases reform pressure, but institutional constraints and implementation capacity shape reform outcomes. The study contributes by explaining when and why criminal justice reform follows recurring patterns of constrained institutional adaptation.