Expectations, Reputation, and Accountability in Scandals: A Configurational Analysis of 15 Cases in China

Social media has emerged as a powerful instrument enabling citizens to reveal misconduct and improper actions of government officials, with such scandals frequently attracting significant public scrutiny. Nonetheless, the extant scholarly literature offers limited insight into the account‐holding decisions made by local governments to manage and respond to these scandals. By integrating principal‐agent theory and reputation management theory, this research employs the Qualitative Comparative Analysis method to investigate 15 scandals involving government officials that were publicized on Chinese social media platforms. Our study has identified two mechanisms, namely the political signaling mechanism and the reputation‐restoration mechanism, in explaining the high strength of accountability of Chinese local governments in governing scandals involving government officials. Moreover, our findings highlight one primary factor, performance‐reputation threats, as an essential determinant of local governments' adoption of stringent account‐holding measures in response to these incidents. This study advances accountability theory and deepens understanding of how local governments in China strategically deploy sanctions to manage scandals and preserve legitimacy through accountability.