Why the Good Is the Ultimate Form

In a much‐debated passage from the Republic, Plato claims that the Good is responsible not only for the knowability of the eternal forms, but also for their very existence. This is a perplexing claim, and few contemporary platonists have been willing to follow Plato here. Even so, I develop and defend an argument to the effect, given that there are transcendent universals and that the Good is one of them, the Good cannot simply be one universal among many, but rather must be a ‘Super‐Form’—that is, a universal such that all other universals exist because of it. I then address the questions of whether the Good can itself be good in the same way that other things are good, and whether there could be additional Super‐Forms like the One. I conclude with the suggestion that contemporary platonists should reconsider the medieval ‘doctrine of transcendentals’.