Regulating digital platforms requires choices about the protection of dependent business users, the control of platform conduct, and the institutions responsible for enforcement. These choices shape the relationship between statutory regulation and conventional antitrust. This article examines Türkiye’s 2022 electronic commerce reform through doctrinal analysis and systematic coding of provisions by their distinct legal effects. The analysis traces the distribution of protection, obligations, regulatory techniques, and administrative authority. The reform adds explicit safeguards for marketplace sellers while retaining the original buyer protections. Its coverage and conduct duties rely on statutory categories and quantitative conditions rather than individualized findings of dominance or competitive harm. Rules govern coverage and most conduct duties. Within the conduct provisions, sales-linked and budget-linked penalties attach to rule-coded duties rather than fairness standards. Functional mapping distinguishes core competition-related analogues from broader, more contestable similarities. Administrative competition law by proxy describes this combination of competition-related duties, rule-based coverage, and ministerial supervision. The findings identify questions of proportionality, proxy accuracy, and institutional coordination. They concern statutory design rather than the reform’s competitive effects.
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Fatih Cemil Özbuğday (2026) studied this question.
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