This treatise addresses the institutional petrification of Title II (The Crown) of the 1978 Spanish Constitution (Constitución Española, CE) resulting from the aggravated constitutional revision procedure codified in Article 168 CE. It establishes an end-to-end statutory and comparative public law framework to modernize crown governance, asset transparency, and judicial accountability without provoking a systemic constitutional crisis. Employing non-cooperative game theory, constitutional dogmatics, and comparative legal analysis across European parliamentary monarchies (the United Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Norway), this study models the strategic incentives governing parliamentary decision-making in fragmented legislative environments. The analysis proves that Article 168’s four-stage revision funnel—requiring successive two-thirds parliamentary supermajorities, immediate mandatory legislative dissolution, subsequent re-ratification, and a binding national referendum—creates a dominant Nash equilibrium of legislative inaction. Consequently, direct constitutional amendment of royal inviolability (Article 56.3 CE) or male-preference primogeniture (Article 57.1 CE) has a transition probability approaching zero. To resolve this institutional paradox, this monograph formalizes a sub-constitutional statutory pathway via organic legislation (infra-constitutional normativity under Article 81 CE). The primary contribution is a comprehensive, parallel bilingual (Castilian–English) draft of a Model Organic Law of the Crown (Proyecto de Ley Orgánica de la Corona), comprising: 1. Functional Delimitation of Inviolability: Codifying the constitutional nexus between Article 56.3 and Article 64, establishing that royal inviolability protects solely official, public State acts validated by ministerial countersignature (refrendo). Un-countersigned private, commercial, civil, and penal acts are formally excluded from jurisdictional immunity. 2. Comprehensive External Financial Oversight: Subjecting the Royal Household’s entire annual budgetary block grant (Article 65.1 CE) to binding, public annual audits conducted by the Court of Auditors (Tribunal de Cuentas), accompanied by mandatory asset and interest disclosures and strict prohibitions on offshore accounts. 3. Protocol and Asset Reversion Regime: Regulating institutional gifts, commercial conflicts of interest, and mandating the automatic reversion of gifts of significant historical or financial value to the National Heritage (Patrimonio Nacional). 4. Post-Abdication Jurisdictional Architecture: Establishing an exclusive forum (aforamiento) before the Civil and Criminal Chambers of the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) strictly limited to non-countersigned acts, eliminating perpetual unaccountability. 5. Harmonization of Succession Parity: Outlining pre-commitment and international human rights treaty harmonizations (under Article 10.2 CE and CEDAW) to resolve the antinomy between Article 57.1’s agnatic preference and the non-discrimination mandate of Article 14 CE. The monograph includes a complete doctrinal commentary, formal game-theoretic payoff models, a transcribed parliamentary committee debate with cross-party amendments, and a certified roll-call vote analysis.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Group et al. (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: