This paper examines whether ownership structure moderates the relationship between market-timing incentives and the likelihood of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Using a panel of Australian listed firms and logit specifications, market-timing incentives are proxied by market-to-book ratios and pre-issue abnormal returns, while ownership structure is measured by the largest shareholder’s stake and institutional ownership. The results show that the positive association between market-timing proxies and SEO likelihood is weaker when ownership is more concentrated in the hands of the largest shareholder. Institutional ownership, by contrast, does not exhibit a robust moderating effect. These findings suggest that concentrated ownership may reduce firms’ sensitivity to market-timing signals, contrary to the initial expectation that large shareholders have stronger incentives to exploit overvaluation.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Jonibek Isomiddinov (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: