The Constraint-Relative Framework: A Mechanism for Collective Motor Action

Every theory of collective intentionality assumes that what makes a collective action collective is a shared mental state. Searle requires we-intentions. Gilbert requires joint commitment. Bratman requires shared plans. Tuomela requires group reasons. List and Pettit require aggregation procedures. Ludwig requires we-mode. Even the minimalists assume that something must be shared. None of them specify the identity conditions of collective action. They specify what must be added to two individual actions to make them collective. They do not specify what makes the resulting thing one action. This paper proposes the identity conditions. It argues that collective action is what a Joint Adjustment Loop produces when it runs with positive adjustment toward a constrained target. The loop has six components, each specified operationally. The identity conditions are graded, description-relative, and interventionist. The framework stratifies the domain into minimal collective action and full collective intentional action, dissolves the cooperation/coordination distinction, and rejects the representational requirement that has constrained the literature for forty years.