A view of the green-brown conflict between government and firms from the perspective of evolutionary games

Motivated by the growing literature on global environmental issues and the increasing role of government initiatives aimed at promoting green production as a strategy to mitigate environmental pollution, this paper proposes a game-theoretic model to describe the conditions under which firms can be effectively incentivized to produce green goods, supported by government protection and fiscal incentives. In addition, in this work we introduce a dynamic component to the model to analyze the evolution over time of the environmentally friendly decisions of firms and government and its possible convergens toward: (ⅰ) a green equilibrium, in which both the government and firms actively engage in environmental protection; (ⅱ) a brown equilibrium, where pollution and environmental damage are largely ignored, with economic profits and tax revenues prioritized over environmental concerns; or (ⅲ) inefficient equilibria, in which the government and firms take divergent approaches. We also identify the conditions under which a mixed equilibrium may arise, in which environmentally responsible and indifferent behaviors coexist.