Conspiracism is commonly measured through specific conspiracy beliefs and generalized conspiracy mentality, a broad tendency to suspect conspiracies behind events. Researchers often assume that these measures are psychometrically distinct and that mentality accounts for correlations among beliefs. We evaluate the cross‐sectional statistical implications of these assumptions using psychological network analysis in three comparative studies spanning nearly 30,000 respondents, 17 country samples and multiple validated scales. Mentality and beliefs are generally distinguishable, but their structural relationship varies across measurement strategies. With a comparative cross‐national belief battery, Study 1 falsifies the mentality‐centred account in seven of eight countries; the belief‐centred account is supported in France and falsified nowhere. Study 2, using salient US‐specific beliefs, points towards the mentality‐centred account, although both tests are inconclusive. With country‐specific beliefs, Study 3 falsifies the mentality‐centred account in six countries and the belief‐centred account in all eight. These findings challenge the view that conspiracy mentality consistently organizes beliefs and underscore the importance of how both constructs are measured.
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Bertero et al. (2026) studied this question.
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