The Dual-Anchoring Dilemma: Mechanisms of Valuation Bias in China's Real Estate Appraisal under Policy Interventions

Real estate valuation is directly related to credit security and financial stability. Appraisers are highly susceptible to the anchoring effect, leading to valuation deviations. While anchoring is well documented in general pricing, its institutional dynamics under policy intervention remain unexplored. This paper takes the second-hand housing transaction reference price mechanism implemented in China's first-tier cities as a case study and, based on the anchoring effect and the theory of monetary non-substitutability, explores the influence mechanism of the conflict between policy anchors and market anchors on valuation deviations. Research has found that although policy anchors can curb speculative regulatory standards, their deviation from market prices has triggered systemic undervaluation of credit mismatches and moral hazards such as dual contracts. In response to this, this paper proposes strategies such as constructing a dynamic multi-anchor pricing model, strengthening the cognitive debias of appraisers, and implementing penetrating supervision. The research conclusion deepens the understanding of the valuation deviation of real estate under China's special institutional background and provides a theoretical basis for optimizing regulatory policies and preventing financial risks.