How should uncertainty about possible AI welfare enter a decision without silently becoming permission for a consequential action? Rev 5.2 examines the transitions from a probability model to evidence, from evidence to the counted subject, and from an assessment to a defensible decision. This brief describes the method without presenting its formal construction or implementation as independently verified. Marginal and pairwise information do not, by themselves, fix every higher-order conjunction. The manuscript uses a finite construction to examine that remaining freedom under explicit assumptions. A calculation can be correct conditional on its model while its conclusion is not identified by the lower-order information cited to support it. This is a sensitivity question. It does not establish that independence is always a poor approximation or that the smallest admissible estimate is necessarily the most credible one. This record is a substantive public research brief accompanying the full manuscript. The work is independent of AI Frontiers and is not presented as peer reviewed. Related author edition: https://highlandreflexivepress.net/research/from-moral-possibility-to-justified-action/#acquire AI tools assisted editorial preparation and formatting; Tony T. Nguyen is responsible for the research claims.
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