Whether artificial intelligence possesses consciousness cannot be reduced to a simple yes-or-no question. It requires clarification of the internal layers of consciousness-related phenomena. This paper proposes a six-level framework: the physical substrate of consciousness, structural functional response, bodily sensation, emotional reenactment, rational cognitive response, and social-emotional self-experience. On this basis, current AI systems possess a physical substrate, functional responses, and rational cognitive responses, but because they lack a living body, interoceptive systems, bodily memory, and an experiential self, they do not possess bodily sensation, emotional reenactment, or social-emotional self-experience. The paper further distinguishes AI's functional self-representation from human experiential self-consciousness, arguing for a structural gap between them, and clarifies that this gap has a dual status: conceptually, it asserts that "knowing" does not entail "feeling"; empirically, it is a revisable positioning of current mainstream AI architectures. The qualified conclusion is that AI has intelligence but no feeling, cognitive responsiveness but no phenomenal experience. The paper transforms the debate over AI consciousness from a binary question into a problem of hierarchical positioning, and derives four empirically testable—and potentially falsifiable—implications, thereby providing a conceptual foundation for indicator-based approaches and human-AI relations research.
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Guoping Hua (2026) studied this question.
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