This study examined how political interference affects value for money in procurement processes within Tanzanian government institutions. It specifically assessed how political influence in procurement planning, tender evaluation, supplier selection, contract award, and contract management affects the achievement of value for money. Despite continuous procurement reforms, Tanzanian government institutions continue to experience procurement malpractices linked to political interference. Such interference often undermines competition, transparency, accountability, and professional decision-making, leading to inflated procurement costs, poor-quality outputs, project delays, and inefficient utilisation of public resources. Although procurement governance has attracted considerable scholarly attention, empirical evidence on the direct effect of political interference on value for money in Tanzania remains limited. The study adopted a positivist philosophy and a quantitative cross-sectional research design. Data were collected from procurement practitioners and other procurement stakeholders in selected government institutions using structured questionnaires. Descriptive statistics and simple linear regression analysis were employed to examine the relationship between political interference and value for money. The findings revealed that political interference has a statistically significant negative influence on value for money. Increased political involvement in procurement decisions was associated with higher procurement costs, reduced transparency, weakened competition, procurement inefficiencies, and poor project outcomes. The study concludes that political interference remains a significant barrier to achieving value for money in public procurement by compromising professional independence and procurement integrity. The study recommends strengthening institutional autonomy, enhancing enforcement of procurement regulations, protecting procurement professionals from undue political influence, and improving transparency and accountability throughout the procurement cycle.
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Gati et al. (2026) studied this question.
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