This study investigated the influence of godfatherism and favouritism on political appointments and grassroots development in Cross River State, Nigeria. Despite democratic advancements, political patronage systems continue to dominate Nigeria’s governance structure, raising concerns about transparency, accountability, and equity in political appointments. The problem was found evident in Cross River State, where political godfathers and networks of favouritism often override meritocracy, thereby limiting grassroots development and democratic consolidation. The study adopted a descriptive survey design with a population of 1,527,289 registered voters in the 2023 general elections. Using Taro Yamane’s formula, a sample of 400 respondents was drawn across the three senatorial districts of the state (North, Central, and South) through stratified random sampling. A structured questionnaire on a four-point Likert scale served as the primary instrument for data collection. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) for the research questions, while one-sample t-test and ANOVA were employed to test three hypotheses at a 0.05 level of significance. Results revealed that godfatherism significantly influences political appointments in Cross River State (t(398) = 5.42, p < 0.05), and that favouritism negatively affects grassroots development (t(398) = 6.87, p < 0.05). Furthermore, there was a significant difference across senatorial districts in the extent to which political patronage impacts grassroots development (F (2, 397) = 4.16, p < 0.05), with the South showing the strongest negative effects. Although a few responses indicated occasional merit-based appointments, the overwhelming evidence confirmed the dominance of patronage politics in the State. The study concludes that godfatherism and favouritism remain critical impediments to democratic governance and grassroots development in Cross River State. It recommends institutional reforms to promote meritbased appointments, civic education to discourage patronage politics, and equitable distribution of appointments across senatorial districts to strengthen democratic institutions and grassroots participation
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Tandu Egbe Ojong (2026) studied this question.
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