Configuring hidden and visible camera enforcement for risky driving deterrence

Road rule violations such as speeding and mobile phone use while driving remain major contributors to road crashes worldwide. Camera-based enforcement is widely implemented to address these behaviours, yet the relative and combined effects of overt and covert enforcement remain insufficiently understood. This investigation develops and tests a deterrence-based framework for identifying the perceived effectiveness of hidden and visible camera enforcement, focusing on key mechanisms including perceived certainty of apprehension and punishment avoidance. A cross-sectional, scenario-based survey was conducted with 1,167 licensed drivers in Australia. Participants evaluated four enforcement configurations (no enforcement, covert cameras, overt cameras, and combined covert and overt cameras). Outcomes included deterrence perceptions, willingness to engage in offending behaviours, and attitudes towards enforcement. Ordinal random forest models were used for variable selection, followed by cumulative link mixed-effects models to estimate effects while accounting for repeated measures. Covert enforcement was associated with higher perceived certainty of apprehension, whereas overt enforcement reduced punishment avoidance and willingness to offend. Punishment avoidance emerged as a central behavioural mechanism, showing stronger associations with willingness than perceived certainty. Combined enforcement aligned these mechanisms, increasing perceived certainty while reducing opportunities for undetected violations. Visible enforcement was also associated with more positive attitudes, indicating a complementary role in supporting legitimacy. The findings demonstrate that deterrence is not a property of individual enforcement mechanisms, but an emergent outcome of how enforcement is configured. Effective strategies should therefore balance uncertainty, visibility, and communication across the road network. These results extend deterrence theory by showing that key mechanisms are co-produced through enforcement configurations and provide practical guidance for designing more effective and publicly acceptable enforcement systems.