Power Without Prosperity? Explaining Divergent Economic Performance Across Authoritarian Regimes

Authoritarian regimes have produced markedly different economic outcomes, ranging from sustained growth and structural transformation to instability and severe decline. This study asks what explains these divergent outcomes and how state capacity, institutional predictability, and economic governance shape economic performance under authoritarian rule. Using a small-N comparative historical design, it conducts a structured comparison of six authoritarian regime-periods: China (1978-1997), South Korea (1961-1979), Singapore (1965-1990), Venezuela (1999-2013), Zimbabwe (1980-2017), and Afghanistan (1996-2001). The analysis examines economic performance, state capacity and institutional quality, development strategies, political organisation, and corruption, rent-seeking, and resource management. Evidence is drawn from World Bank and IMF economic data, established regime- classification datasets and relevant historical and country-specific research. The findings show that authoritarianism alone does not explain economic performance. Stronger outcomes were associated with capable state institutions, policy continuity, institutional predictability, effective implementation, and productive resource allocation, while weaker state capacity, policy instability, resource dependence, and conflict constrained economic performance in the less successful cases. The study therefore highlights the importance of institutional and policy differences within authoritarian systems and contributes to a more differentiated understanding of authoritarian governance and economic development.