This paper examines the relationship between criminal governance and the internationalization of organized crime, using the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) expansion towards Europe as a case study. It argues that governance can facilitate the transnational expansion of criminal organizations by fostering internal cohesion, regulating illicit markets, and enabling civilian control. Drawing on the PCC’s trajectory from a prison-based organization in Brazil to a transnational actor, the analysis identifies a multi stage causal mechanism that started with internal governance—based on the imposition of rules and the dissemination of a shared ideological framework— which enabled PCC to maintain cohesion and coordinate members across geographically dispersed settings. Second, governance within the criminal market provided greater predictability to illicit transactions, strengthened the group’s legitimacy among criminal actors, and facilitated alliances with Bolivian cocaine producers and European mafias. Finally, although to a lesser extent, the PCC’s involvement in civilian governance—particularly in strategic territories like the Baixada Santista—played a critical role in consolidating its presence and projecting influence into European markets. Using the PCC as a theory-building case, the study contributes to the broader literature on criminal governance by providing an analytical framework whose applicability to other criminal organizations that can be examined in future comparative research.
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Gonçalves et al. (2026) studied this question.
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