The rapid adoption of information and communication technologies has fundamentally altered the manner in which courts administer justice. Electronic filing, digital case management, electronic evidence, virtual hearings, digital recording, online payment systems and automated judicial administration are increasingly becoming components of modern justice systems. In East Africa, this transformation has generated important opportunities for improving access to justice, reducing procedural delays, enhancing transparency and strengthening institutional efficiency. At the same time, judicial digitalisation raises complex questions concerning legality, fair hearing, judicial independence, privacy, cybersecurity, electronic evidence, digital exclusion and accountability for technology-assisted decision-making. This article critically examines the emerging legal framework governing digital judicial transformation in East Africa, with particular attention to the legal and institutional developments in Tanzania and Kenya. It argues that judicial digitalisation cannot be understood merely as an administrative transition from paper to electronic systems. It represents a transformation of the manner in which judicial authority is exercised, accessed and scrutinised. Consequently, digital judicial transformation must remain constitutionally and legally anchored in the rule of law. The article demonstrates that both jurisdictions have developed significant legal foundations for electronic justice through constitutional guarantees, electronic transactions legislation, e-filing rules, evidence legislation, data protection laws and cybersecurity frameworks. Nevertheless, substantial regulatory and institutional gaps remain, particularly concerning digital exclusion, technological failures, protection of sensitive judicial data, artificial intelligence, transparency of automated systems and effective remedies for technology-induced procedural injustice. The article recommends an integrated legal framework for digital justice, stronger judicial cybersecurity standards, technology-neutral procedural guarantees, inclusive access mechanisms, comprehensive regulation of artificial intelligence in judicial administration and strengthened regional cooperation. It concludes that technology should remain an instrument of justice rather than becoming a substitute for the legal and constitutional principles upon which judicial authority depends.
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Nemes Chami (2026) studied this question.
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