The Local-Justification-Collective-Harm Paradox (LJCHP): A Generalized N-Component Framework for Local Decision Criteria, Interdependent Actions, and System-Level Harm

Abstract-Shamiul Hoque ShanThis paper specifies the Local-Justification-Collective-Harm Paradox (LJCHP), a proposed framework for investigating situations in which multiple interdependent actors make decisions they regard as acceptable under their own information, goals, roles, constraints, and evaluation criteria, while the combined consequences may exceed a prespecified system-level harm threshold. The framework takes the number of included systemic elements, N, as a model-specific quantity rather than a universal constant. It represents local decisions, local acceptability, interaction networks, state transitions, multidimensional harm, and feedback through a family of finite-component models. A possible extension to infinite index sets is stated with explicit mathematical caveats.The primary illustrative case is an organizational decision chain involving an owner, a chief executive officer, managers, and workers. The same formal architecture can be investigated in larger interorganizational, public, environmental, economic, technological, or transnational systems, provided that each application specifies its system boundary, units of analysis, measures, mechanisms, and evidence. The paper distinguishes the coexistence of local acceptability and system-level harm from the stronger causal claim that locally justified actions produce that harm. It therefore develops testable hypotheses, counterexamples, boundary conditions, research designs, validation criteria, and a reproducible simulation plan.LJCHP is presented as a proposed analytical framework, not as an established universal law. The equations organize concepts and identify testable relationships; they do not establish empirical truth, causal identification, theoretical novelty, or universal validity by themselves. The framework must be assessed against adjacent literature on collective action, bounded rationality, organizational accidents, feedback systems, governance of shared resources, and the problem of many hands.