The Coalition Ceiling: Narrative, Identity, and the Limits of Collective Action

Collective action depends on diverse actors aligning around shared goals, yet coalitions frequently stall or fail to expand even when underlying interests appear broadly compatible. Existing explanations emphasize resource constraints, institutional barriers, or preference divergence, but give limited attention to how narratives themselves impose structural limits on coalition growth. This paper introduces the coalition ceiling to describe the maximum breadth of actors who can align with a movement’s narrative without destabilizing its coherence. Drawing on framing theory, political psychology, and interpretive communication, it argues that narrative choices, particularly moral specification and attribution of responsibility, simultaneously generate internal cohesion and activate identity-based resistance among potential allies. These dynamics produce a structural tradeoff endogenous to narrative design. The paper advances a framework for understanding coalition limits in polarized systems, identifying narrative design as a structural determinant and offering testable propositions.