The Axiomatic Theory of Institutional Stability and Human Sovereignty in AI-Native Economies

This paper develops an axiomatic and mathematical framework for institutional stability, legitimate human authority, and systemic resilience in AI-native economies. It examines the conditions under which increasingly autonomous computational agents may transform economic coordination, financial intermediation, organizational governance, and the operational adequacy of existing institutions. The analysis distinguishes technical stability, economic resilience, accounting consistency, and institutional legitimacy as separate properties. It introduces formal models of delegated authority, institutional viability, network interdependence, correlated agentic decisions, and bounded systemic shocks. A stock-flow-consistent banking framework is employed to examine the accounting implications of credit creation, deposit transfers, interbank settlement, liquidity constraints, and balance-sheet losses. Synthetic sensitivity analyses illustrate how correlated computational feedback and institutional network structures can affect system stability under specified assumptions. The paper further develops conditional criteria for institutional functional obsolescence, distinguishing operational inadequacy from the continued validity of legal authority. Its normative foundations emphasize human dignity, accountability, contestability, proportionality, and the preservation of human agency. The research contributes to the ANOA (AI-Native Organizational Architecture) programme and discusses conceptual relationships with HomeSelf Research concerning verifiable representations, computational infrastructure, and institutional coordination. The mathematical findings are conditional on explicitly stated assumptions. The numerical experiments are illustrative and are not calibrated to empirical banking data. The paper does not claim that all existing institutions are obsolete or that any particular architecture is universally optimal.