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Many theories begin with entities and then explain action, coordination, identity, and persistence through their interactions. The Continuation Primacy Thesis proposes a deliberate inversion: first model the possible and admissible continuations from a state, then ask which participant boundaries, identities, coordinated trajectories, and forms of agency remain intelligible within that structure. The inversion is powerful but does not by itself prove that the future is metaphysically prior to entities. This paper distinguishes formal, explanatory, constitutive, and ontological priority. It specifies the first two, treats the third as a domain-dependent hypothesis, and leaves the fourth open. It replaces several type-invalid equations with a profile over states, conceivable and admissible transitions, viability predicates, participant trajectories, identity criteria, and joint continuation. On this account, continuation structure can scaffold, constrain, and partly explain agency without automatically generating an agent. Shared possible futures do not alone constitute coordination, trajectory overlap does not alone establish identity, and persistence does not establish legitimacy. Continuation Primacy is presented as a focused research thesis and entry point into Dynatology, not as a duplicate of its broader formal architecture.
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