The absence of clear normative parameters for determining “very urgent reasons” in marriage dispensation cases creates broad judicial discretion and may result in inconsistent decisions and inadequate protection of children’s rights. This study aims to examine judicial interpretation of “very urgent reasons” and reconstruct the concept through a child-centered normative framework that provides clearer parameters for judicial decision-making. This study employs doctrinal legal research using statutory, conceptual, and case approaches, supported by prescriptive analysis to identify, evaluate, and reconstruct the relevant legal norms. The findings demonstrate that the minimum marriage age constitutes the rule, while marriage dispensation represents an exception that should only be considered when objective, unavoidable, and urgent circumstances make marriage the only proportionate means of protecting the child. A personal relationship, sexual intercourse, the desire to marry, and family consent do not, by themselves, establish a very urgent reason. Based on these findings, the study develops a Child-Centered Urgency Test comprising five dimensions: urgency, alternatives, child autonomy, responsible readiness, and best interests. The framework shifts judicial inquiry from whether there is a reason to marry toward whether marriage at a particular time is demonstrably necessary for the child’s protection. It provides a structured basis for limiting judicial discretion and positioning marriage dispensation as an exceptional judicial remedy rather than an alternative pathway to underage marriage.
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Yunita et al. (2026) studied this question.
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