Suspended Judgement: Epistemic Neutrality & the Limits of Inferential Commitment

This paper investigates suspended judgement as the rational result of the absence of both acceptance and rejection towards a proposition. We argue that when neither position is adopted, suspended judgement characterises the resulting epistemic neutrality, provided that the proposition remains under rational consideration. This absence must be distinguished from the adoption of a third fundamental inferential position, since suspended judgement does not independently establish an affirmative or negative inferential commitment. We examine how this account remains compatible with hypothetical reasoning, in which propositions may be provisionally accepted or rejected without requiring belief or permanent commitment. Such provisional positions permit inquiry to proceed while judgement concerning its central proposition remains suspended. Furthermore, we distinguish the absence of warranted acceptance and rejection from pure inattention or failure to consider propositional content. By examining the relationship between inferential warrant, epistemic neutrality and provisional commitment, we defend suspended judgement as a derivative epistemic condition rather than an independent inferential position.