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This study asks why expanding Chinese influence in the Middle East has not produced either American strategic displacement or a stable bipolar order. Drawing on Regional Security Complex Theory, documentary analysis and eight expert interviews, the article develops asymmetric multipolarity: a regional order in which several external and regional actors are consequential, but their capabilities and functions are distributed unevenly across security, economic, technological and diplomatic domains. A structured comparison of Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates identifies three responses. Saudi Arabia pursues dual-track diversification, retaining US defence dependence while expanding Chinese energy and infrastructure ties. The UAE employs functional compartmentalization but faces sharper constraints where artificial intelligence, cloud infrastructure and export controls connect economics with national security. Iran’s China relationship is better understood as sanctions-constrained alignment because confrontation with Washington narrows its alternatives. Across the cases, the United States remains the principal provider of deterrence, interoperability and maritime security, whereas China is a major trade, energy, infrastructure and technology partner without assuming equivalent security burdens. The article separates polarity from sectoral influence and shows that regional agency mediates great power rivalry without eliminating structural dependence. The Middle East is therefore moving neither towards Chinese hegemony nor simple bipolarity, but towards a differentiated order of competitive coexistence.
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Yasmin et al. (2026) studied this question.
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