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Judges sentence under psychological conditions that the law does little to specify. Two of those conditions involve trauma: the defendant’s trauma history, which may be offered as mitigating evidence, and the sentencing judge’s own accumulated exposure to accounts of violence and harm. This paper asks whether sustained contemplative practice, meaning meditation and mindfulness training undertaken over time, moderates how these two influences shape sentencing attitudes, and proposes a theoretical framework specifying how it might do so. Drawing on dual-process theory and affect-as-information theory, we argue that the relevant effect is not that contemplative practice calms decision-makers or recruits more deliberation. It is that practice changes whether a feeling arising during sentencing is treated as evidence about the defendant or recognized as a transient mental state bearing no relation to the case. We specify three pathways through which this may operate: affective regulation and threat attenuation, reduced automaticity of biased responding, and increased receptivity to mitigation. We situate the model in relation to therapeutic jurisprudence, restorative justice, and classical Indian jurisprudence, drawing on these as context rather than as evidence. We state four falsifiable predictions, identify the conditions under which the framework would fail, and set out an evaluation-first research agenda.
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Mishra et al. (2026) studied this question.
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