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Egypt’s policy toward Gaza has been characterized by a persistent tension between its asserted role as a regional mediator and the imperatives of national security and regime stability. This article analyzes the institutionalization of a security-centered approach from the Second Intifada onward and argues that this approach evolved through a path-dependent process, with the General Intelligence Service (GIS) gaining greater authority over the Palestinian file after 2000. The GIS prioritized crisis management, border control, coercive pressure, and intelligence-led mediation over political alternatives. This institutional arrangement sustained a containment strategy despite changes in political leadership. Rather than pursuing the complete isolation or elimination of Hamas, containment combined restrictions on its political and military influence with selective engagement and mediation, resulting in a relationship of adversarial interdependence. This approach enabled Egypt to regulate the border while managing relations with Palestinian actors, containing violence, and maintaining its regional role. However, the Zionist-led genocidal war following October 7, 2023 exposed the contradictions and limitations of this strategy. Containment imposed severe political, humanitarian, and social costs on Palestinians without preventing instability or restoring Egypt’s regional centrality. The war also revealed the fragility of the security arrangements on which Cairo had relied to reconcile border control, regime stability, and its claimed status as a regional mediator.
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Dima Alsajdeya (2026) studied this question.
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