On a Proposed Kantian Solution to the Nonidentity Problem

According to K. Lindsey Chambers (2025), “if we start from within Kant’s moral framework, the non-identity problem doesn’t arise for morally responsive procreators”. However, Chambers is mistaken: the nonidentity problem is independent of whether we start from a Kantian or a consequentialist framework. Understanding this is important; otherwise, we run the risk of mistaking either the boundaries of normative ethics, the nature of the nonidentity problem, or both, with all that this entails. To explain this, this article is divided into three sections. First, I introduce the version of the nonidentity problem with which Chambers is primarily concerned, Teenaged Mother. Second, I introduce, and subsequently critique, Chambers’ explanation of how Kantian ethics obviates this problem. Third, I explain how Chambers’ account nonetheless can be applied to another philosophical issue of recent interest in reproductive ethics — namely, the ethics of prenatal injury.