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The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine prompted unprecedented Western sanctions, which amounted to more than 23,000 sanctions during 2022-2024. However, these sanctions failed to fulfill their designated objective of influencing the end of the Russia-Ukraine War. Russian responses to progressively augmented sanctions have sparked debates surrounding microeconomic sovereignty, macroeconomic adaptability, and, foremost, resilience. The article’s findings reveal that while sanctions have not brought the Russian Federation to acquiesce, they have catalyzed a structural, politically induced policy shift into a Complex Adaptive Resilience (CAR) framework. Russia's ability to build resilience against sanctions has been manifested structurally in its strategy to reinforce economic and strategic partnerships and in policies to maintain government expenditure and manage adequate economic growth. The article highlights how CAR functions as short-term survival, while also ensuring longer-term systemic stability. This study concludes that Russia’s current resilience is an asymmetrical approach to balance structural fragility embedded in its geopolitical complexities.
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Puspitarini et al. (2026) studied this question.
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