Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
Philosophers of science increasingly invoke the label "empirical philosophy of science," yet the term empirical is used in heterogeneous ways, ranging from philosophical engagement with scientific practice to the use of empirical methods in philosophical analysis. This paper argues that a third sense of empirical philosophy is emerging across a group of contemporary thinkers often associated with this label but rarely theorized together. Authors such as Bruno Latour, Isabelle Stengers, Donna Haraway, Vinciane Despret, Baptiste Morizot, and Michel Serres are often grouped under the label of "empirical philosophy," yet the meaning and coherence of this label remain unclear. We develop this third sense through the methodological writings of Annemarie Mol. Her work offers a systematic account of how philosophical concepts can be generated through sustained engagement with empirical practices. Drawing on and extending her supervisor Lolle Nauta's notion of the exemplary situation, Mol treats philosophical systems as places where philosophical and empirical sensibilities intertwine. Her work foregrounds empirical inscriptions-the social, material, and linguistic contexts that shape conceptual work-while simultaneously also arguing that the philosophical is present in empirical descriptions and practices. We synthesize these moves into what we call the multi-tool of empirical philosophy, consisting of four components: cultivating empirical inscriptions in philosophy, philosophical insights in empirical descriptions, philosophies at work in empirical practices, and the practical implications of philosophical concepts. This framework clarifies both the unity of Mol's oeuvre and the coherence of contemporary empirical philosophy within philosophy of science.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Peeters et al. (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: