Schelling and Heidegger on the Problem of Evil

This article examines Heidegger’s interpretation of Schelling’s conception of the essence of evil. The first part outlines the fundamental features of Schelling’s understanding of evil, while the second analyses the points of convergence and divergence between the two thinkers. Both Schelling and Heidegger conceive evil as an ontological and metaphysical problem rather than a merely moral or anthropological one; they reject the classical doctrine of malum qua privatio boni and understand evil as a positive spiritual force. However, Heidegger departs from Schelling by setting aside the theological background, emphasizing the permanent tension between good and evil, and abandoning the idea of their final reconciliation. Moreover, the philosopher from Meßkirch replaces the notion of “evil” with concepts such as “forgetfulness of being”, “abandonment of being”, “metaphysics”, “nihilism”, and “technology”. Finally, the article concludes that Heidegger’s understanding of evil remains, in its essential features, closer to Schelling’s than Heidegger himself acknowledges.