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Why do some ostensibly ‘soft’ deterrence signals coincide with sharper escalation than sustained material pressure? Existing theories emphasise signal cost and credibility, yet East Asian interactions suggest that signal intensity and response severity do not always align. This article proposes a configurational framework linking signal carrier, structural reassurance and adversary cognition. It examines three Japan–China cases—the phased reinforcement of the Southwestern Islands, the 2014 reinterpretation of collective self-defense and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s November 2025 Diet remarks on a ‘survival-threatening situation’. The evidence suggests that signals preserving operational adjustability, observable conditions and institutional friction leave room for gain-domain monitoring and incremental response, whereas signals that narrow these channels are more likely to trigger loss-prevention or identity-defensive framing. The article thus extends reassurance scholarship by specifying how material, legal and institutional signal forms shape whether restraint appears capable of preserving a recoverable position.
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Jianjun Lian (2026) studied this question.
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