Bargaining with Ballots: Legal Coercion and Brokerage Networks in Indonesia’s 2024 Election

This study examines how legal–administrative vulnerability was converted into political leverage through patronage infrastructures during Indonesia’s 2024 elections. Using a mechanism-tracing comparison of Sidoarjo and Gresik – two politically salient districts in East Java – the article shows how subnational leaders recalibrated endorsements under conditions of heightened legal exposure, even when protection was uncertain and outcomes varied. Based on rare access to elite interviews with local executives, party officials, and campaigners, the analysis explains how coercive pressure is routed through embedded networks, especially familial and religious ties, so that abrupt realignment becomes organisationally feasible and publicly legible. The findings highlight a probabilistic logic of ‘protection’: what is exchanged is often not guaranteed immunity but instead the perceived chance of reduced escalation and improved scope for bargaining, while the uncertainty of enforcement itself strengthens incentives for compliance. The article argues that national actors treated visible local alignment as politically valuable for maximising margins and projecting cross-network consensus in a contested succession environment. The result is a form of electoral politics in which formal competition persists but representation is increasingly shaped by exposure management, contributing to democratic regression through the politicised deployment – and perceived politicisation – of legal and administrative power.