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We conduct a survey experiment with a politically representative sample of more than 5,000 U.S. consumers to study how perceptions of the Federal Reserve’s (Fed) political stance shape macroeconomic expectations, trust, and information processing. Overall, 63.5% of respondents view the Fed as politically neutral, 9.4% as aligned with their own party (in-group), and 27.2% as opposed (out-group). The non-neutral minority differs sharply: out-group respondents report substantially higher inflation expectations and lower trust than neutral or in-group respondents, even after controlling for partisanship and demographics. They also pay more to avoid opposing media and are less likely to receive Fed communication—yet update their expectations by more once exposed to it, placing less weight on their priors when the same article carries a Fed label. In a hypothetical Trump presidency, the neutral share falls to 37.2%, with respondents in both parties shifting toward viewing the Fed as Republican-leaning, consistent with expected political capture. Perceived neutrality is thus central to the Fed’s credibility and the reach of its communication, and it can shift with changes in political leadership.
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Kuang et al. (2026) studied this question.
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