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Beneficial ownership transparency shapes the quality of the financial intelligence on which anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) measures rely. South Africa's 2022 reforms secured a largely compliant re-rating of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations 24 and 25 and preceded its removal from the grey list in October 2025, but the effectiveness of the reformed regime remains to be re-tested. This article assesses that regime for companies, close corporations and trusts against the adequacy and accuracy of the information it yields. It analyses the FATF standards purposively and shows that its assessment process risks rewarding legislative change more readily than institutional capacity. It also assesses the United Kingdom's register of persons with significant control, with its cumulative identification tests, look-through of nominee holdings and reasoned threshold, for comparative insight. Turning to the Companies Act 71 of 2008, the article distinguishes the beneficial holdership of securities, beneficial interests and beneficial ownership of companies, and submits that the statutory definition of a "beneficial owner", read purposively, gives effect to Recommendation 24. The weaknesses lie elsewhere: an ineffectual 5% threshold; the absence of any verification of beneficial ownership status or duty on beneficial owners themselves; no enforceable obligations for close corporations; a fragmented and unverified trust register; and a disclosure regime for affected companies that depends on those records to identify beneficial owners. The article concludes that the regime remains exposed to findings of ineffectiveness at the next mutual evaluation.
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Philip Beer (2026) studied this question.
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