Anti-corruption policies: examining and evaluating the integration of agencies and whistleblower systems

This article interrogates dominant anti-corruption evaluation models by foregrounding the integration between Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) and whistleblower systems as a critical yet underexamined determinant of institutional effectiveness. Drawing on institutional theory, regulatory governance, and structured cross-country comparison, it develops a four-part typology of ACA–whistleblower integration regimes (complementary, substitutive, fragmented, and minimalist) based on document-based qualitative evaluation across 13 countries. The findings suggest that institutional coordination and interoperability, rather than the formal existence of anti-corruption institutions alone, are consistently associated with stronger enforcement capacity, greater institutional legitimacy, and higher public trust. The study challenges checklist-based global evaluation models that privilege institutional presence over institutional interaction and proposes an integration-centred framework for assessing integrity systems. By shifting attention from institutional design to institutional integration, the study offers a context-sensitive diagnostic approach for evaluating anti-corruption governance across diverse political and administrative settings.