Towards a theory of authoritarian anti-corruption governance in China

This article empirically and theoretically examines how China curbs corruption without recourse to democratic institutions. Drawing on interview data and government documents, the article develops a theory of authoritarian anti-corruption governance that integrates Yuen Yuen Ang’s typology of corruption, Christopher Carothers’s account of the authoritarian approach to corruption control, and the logic of adaptive governance into a single explanatory framework. The article discusses adaptive anti-corruption governance by exploring four key balancing strategies used by the party-state: balancing central–local relations, balancing punishment and prevention, balancing ‘hunting tigers’ and ‘swatting flies’, and balancing anti-corruption efforts with socio-economic development. Our firsthand evidence suggests that current anti-corruption strategies are effective against petty theft, speed money, and grand theft but appear to be less effective in preventing the use of access money. The article also discusses several major shortcomings of current anti-corruption measures, including the absence of an effective oversight mechanism to supervise disciplinary officials, the disruptive impact of overzealous disciplinary inspection on the routine functions of other government agencies, and the imbalance between supervisory and prosecutorial power in handling corruption cases.