How data asset accounting enhances inclusive finance: an evolutionary analysis using signaling game models

Information asymmetry remains a major obstacle to inclusive finance for micro and small enterprises (MSEs). This study develops an evolutionary signaling game model in which boundedly rational MSEs and banks adapt their strategies through repeated interactions to examine whether observable data asset disclosures can serve as a supplementary financing signal under emerging accounting systems. The results show that when banks consider observable data asset disclosures in lending decisions and set loan amounts within an appropriate range, high-potential MSEs are more likely to continue digital transformation and disclose capitalized data assets, allowing banks to improve their assessment of firm quality and achieve a separating equilibrium. However, excessively high or low loan amounts weaken the signaling mechanism. The study suggests that observable data asset disclosures may help reduce financing-related information asymmetry under appropriate institutional conditions. While the model is calibrated to China’s emerging data asset accounting framework, the proposed mechanism may also provide theoretical insights for other economies undergoing digital accounting reforms.