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This commentary engages with Andreas Elpidorou’s The Anatomy of Boredom by exploring one of the philosophical questions that emerges from its functional account of boredom. I argue that Elpidorou’s defense of boredom as a unified regulatory emotion provides the conceptual framework for addressing a further problem: the persistence of boredom under conditions in which its regulatory function remains diagnostically accurate but practically unresolved. If boredom ordinarily functions by signaling unsatisfactory cognitive engagement and motivating the pursuit of more meaningful alternatives, how should we understand cases in which this regulatory process fails to achieve its intended outcome? Building on my recent work in The Disease of Boredom, I suggest that chronic boredom should not be understood as a challenge to Elpidorou’s theory but as one of its most fruitful philosophical extensions. The distinction between successful and unsuccessful regulation opens new questions concerning the relationship between emotional function, agency, and the practical conditions under which meaningful engagement becomes possible. Finally, I briefly bring Elpidorou’s account into conversation with Hans Blumenberg’s reflections on boredom, arguing that functional, historical, and existential approaches should be understood as complementary rather than competing levels of explanation.
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Josefa Ros Velasco (2026) studied this question.
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