The Emotional Dog Gets Mistaken for a Possum

H. D. Saltzstein and T. Kasachkoff (2004) critique the social intuitionist model ( J. Haidt, 2001 ), but the model they critique is a stripped-down version that should be called the “possum” model. They make 3 charges about the possum model that are not true about the social intuitionist model: that it includes no role for reasoning, that it reduces social influence to compliance, and that it does not take a developmental perspective. After a defense of the honor of the social intuitionist model, this article raises 2 areas of legitimate dispute: the scope and nature of moral reasoning and the usefulness of appealing to innate ideas, rather than to learning and reasoning, as the origin of moral knowledge. This article presents 3 clusters of innate moral intuitions, related to sympathy, hierarchy, and reciprocity.