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Abstract This paper deals with the proposals put forward by supporters of a privileged partnership as an alternative final destination for Turkey's integration with the European Union (EU). It outlines Turkey-EU relations with a focus on the final outcome of relations and analyses the content of, support for and attractiveness of the privileged partnership offer for Turkey. Supporting the maintenance of the prospect of membership without any alternatives and by toughening the conditions and strictly monitoring the progress of all would-be members, the paper argues that the introduction of privileged partnership as an alternative to accession dilutes the importance and influence of the accession process on the Europeanisation of Turkey and risks the success of an EU enlargement policy designed to promote stability and security beyond the EU. Key words: Privileged partnershipTurkeyEU enlargementassociation Acknowledgements I would like to thank Dr David Phinnemore for his comments on the earlier versions of this paper. I am also grateful to Guido Müntel and Zeyneb Çağlıyan for our discussions on the concept of ‘privileged partnership’. Responsibility for this version is mine. Notes 1Emphasis added. 2There was no question at the time of Turkey's eligibility for membership in terms of the country being European. As the President of the European Commission, Walter Hallstein (Citation1979) noted in 1963: ‘Today, we are witnessing an event of great political significance. Turkey belongs to Europe. The deepest meaning to the event may be expressed as follows: This is the endorsement of a fact rather than the abbreviated expressions of a geographical evaluation or a historical determination which has been valid for the last couple of centuries. … Therefore, what could be more natural that the identification of Turkey and Europe – which means free self-expression – with each other in their military, political and economic actions and reaction.’ 3Author interview with an official in the Delegation of European Commission to Turkey, Ankara, 25 April 2005. 4The Opinion emphasised that the Community had neither the energy nor capacity to proceed to accession negotiations with Turkey at a time when it was in a ‘state of flux’ and was moving towards EMU and the EU. Although this was seen as sufficient reason not to issue a positive recommendation, democratic standards, particularly with regard to human rights and respect for the identity of minorities, were below the required level and the Commission did not foresee that Turkey could overcome its economic problems within a short period, which raised budgetary concerns about Turkey's possible accession. 5Author interview with a high-level Turkish diplomat based in Turkey's Permanent Representation to the EU, Brussels, 4 July 2005. 6Emphasis added. 7Author interview with an official in the Delegation of European Commission to Turkey, Ankara, 25 April 2005. 8See for example: Dervişet al. (Citation2004); Hughes (Citation2004); Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (Citation2004); Quaisser and Reppegather (Citation2004); Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey (Citation2004). 9Emphasis in the original. 10Minister of Interior – CDU. 11Chairman of CDU parliamentary group in the Berlin Parliament, former Parliamentary Undersecretary of State of Federal Ministry of Defence and former CDU foreign affairs spokesman. 12Member of Foreign Affairs Committee in the Bundestag – CSU. 13The chairman of Europe Committee in the German Bundestag – CDU. 14It should be noted that German right newspapers Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Die Welt highly praised the efforts of Austrian chancellor in supporting privileged partnership alternative for Turkey, see Spiegel Online (Citation2005). 15 BBC News (Citation2005) quoted Angela Merkel saying ‘We need to find solutions, within a privileged partnership, which make it possible to bring Turkey and Europe together without going as far as accession.’ 16Similarly Samuel P. Huntington (Citation2005) argued that ‘a leading state for Islam would be good for Islam and good for the world. It also seems to me that Turkey is better suited to fulfil that role than anyone else.’ 17Along the same lines, Poettering (Citation2004b) stated the following during the debate on Turkey's progress towards accession in the EP on 13 December 2004: ‘Those in our group who either do not want negotiations or want them to tend towards a privileged partnership – among whose number I include myself – are gravely concerned that, should Turkey join the European Union, this enlargement might prove fatal and Europeans might lose their identity, that it might be detrimental to the sense of being “us” on which solidarity in the European Union is founded.’ 18Case 12/86, Demirel v. Stadt Schwäbisch Gmünd, ECR 1987, pp. 3719 – 3755. 19It should be noted that Malta has secured a permanent exemption that prevents EU citizens from buying holiday homes in Malta. 20In addition to Turkey, Angela Merkel also suggested privileged partnership for Western Balkan states. See EUobserver (Citation2006). 21Author interview with an adviser to the AKP government on European affairs, Ankara, 21 April 2005. 22Rehn (Citation2006a) also stated that ‘in reality, no form of privileged partnership could exceed what the EU-Turkey relations have already accomplished. Turkey already has a customs union with the EU, participates in many EU programmes, and is a member of NATO, which makes it far more than a privileged partner in terms of security policy. Moreover, the EU contributes to social and regional cohesion that amounts to half a billion euros per year. What more could the EU offer apart from EU membership in institutions?’ 23For example, PM Erdogan categorically rejected the privileged partnership offer Angela Merkel presented during her visit to Turkey as an opposition leader in February 2004. See Radikal (Citation2004); Additionally, in an interview with the author, a high-level Turkish diplomat in Brussels stated that Turkey rejects and will continue to reject any offer such as permanent derogations which may pave the way for privileged partnership and water down the meaning of membership, 4 July 2005. 24See also the comments of Bahadır Kaleağası (Parliament Magazine, Citation2004), the representative of the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD) to the EU and UNICE, who described proposals offering Turkey an alternative final destinations short of membership as ‘indecent’ and to be considered as a ‘neo-colonialist approach’ or ‘a joke’; Author interview with Bahadır Kaleağası, Brussels, 21 June 2005. 25According to the 2006 Transatlantic Trends survey, the percentage of Turks who see EU membership as a ‘good thing’ decreased from 73% in 2004 to 54% in 2006. This was mainly explained by the EU's ‘unrelenting barrage of discomfort with potential Turkish membership’ since the 2004 decision to open accession negotiations and problems concerning the Cyprus issue (Kınıklıoğlu, Citation2006). See also Turkish FM Gül's remarks to Financial Times (Citation2006a). 26See also the remarks of the then Turkish General Tuncer Kılınç in 2002 on turning towards Russia and Iran as alternatives to Europe (The Economist, Citation2002). 27See also Note 16.
Erhan İçener (Fri,) studied this question.
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