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Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. The term was used a handful of times in the 1990s, but only really came into more widespread usage in the wake of the Russia's interruption of natural gas supplies to Ukraine in January 2006. 2. William Tomson Michael Ellman (ed. ), Russia's Oil and Natural Gas: Bonanza or Curse? (Anthem Press, 2006). 5. Construction on Nord Stream started in 2005. It will cross the Baltic Sea from Vyborg to Germany. Blue Stream was finished in 2005 and brings gas across the Black Sea to Turkey. South Stream is planned to carry gas to Bulgaria, Greece and Italy, with a branch to Romania and Hungary. 6. Adam Stulberg, Well-Oiled Diplomacy: Strategic Manipulation and Russia's Energy Statecraft in Eurasia (State University of New York Press, 2007). 7. Putin scored a coup in 2005 in hiring former Social Democratic Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder to head the new Gazprom joint venture building the Nord Stream pipeline across the Baltic. Similarly, in 2007 Putin persuaded the Social Democratic government in Hungary to use Budapest as a hub for the planned South Stream pipeline across the Black Sea. South Stream is a rival to the EU-sponsored Nabucco project, which would bring gas from Azerbaijan (and hopefully Turkmenistan) through Turkey and Greece. 8. In 2007 Putin announced a 10-year, US250 billion military spending program. 9. Jonathan Stern, The Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom (Oxford University Press, 2005). 10. Michael L. Ross, 'Does Oil Hinder Democracy? ', World Politics, Vol. 53, No. 3 (2001), pp. 325–61 and 'The Political Economy of the Resource Curse', World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (1999), pp. 297–322. 11. Sixty per cent of Russia's export earnings come from oil and gas, and another 30 per cent from resource-intensive metals exports. 12. On the corrosive influence of oil on Russian democracy, see Stephen Fish, Democracy Derailed in Russia (Cambridge University Press, 2005), ch. 5. Former presidential economics advisor Andrei Illarionov is also a sceptic. See his article 'A Long-term Project for Russia', Russia in Global Affairs, No. 13 (2005), pp. 49–56. 13. For example, only 56 per cent of its crude oil, 34 per cent of its natural gas and 42 per cent of refined oil products are exported. The rest is used among other things for manufacturing metals and chemicals. Shinichiro Tabata, 'Oil and Gas Revenues and their Influence on Economic Growth in Russia', paper presented to the ICCEES conference, Berlin, July 2005. 14. Sadek Bousseni & Catherine Locatelli, 'Towards a More Coherent Oil Policy in Russia? ', OPEC Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2005), pp. 85–100. 15. World Bank, Russian Economic Report, No. 12, April 2006. 16. As George Kennan noted half a century ago, Russia's defensive paranoia could be self-defeating. 'X' (George Kennan), 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1947), pp. 566–82. 17. Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 1999). 18. Vladimir Milov, 'Would Russia Cut Off Gas Supplies to Europe? ', Argumenty i Fakty, 17 May 2006. 19. Askold Krushelnycky, 'Rift Threatens Belarus Ties with Russia', The Independent, 20 February 2004. 20. In 2000, Putin himself pointed out that at 8 per cent annual growth it would take 18 years for Russia to catch up with Portugal in terms of GDP per capita. Additional informationNotes on contributorsPeter RutlandPeter Rutland, Government Department, Wesleyan University, 238 Church Street, Middletown, CT 06459, USA.
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Peter Rutland
Wesleyan University
New Political Economy
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Peter Rutland (Mon,) studied this question.
synapsesocial.com/papers/6a1d40a31e7099f69105238e — DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13563460802018547