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This paper offers a parsimonious theory of national institutional factors that promote or inhibit the formation of start-up firms in the USA and Japan. Three factors are proposed: the technical labor market, the venture capital market and the structure of buyer-supplier ties. Complementarities between these factors cause them to work as a system, while their differences elevate or reduce the level of incentive constraints and appropriability constraints acting on incumbent and start-up firms respectively. As a result, incumbents might be displaced in an industry in one country while incumbent firms in the same industry in another country might persevere, due to the presence or absence of start-up firms. This suggests that there may be no single best way to organize for innovation in different institutional settings; rather, firms must seek to exploit the virtues of their environment, even as they act to mitigate the hazards it poses.
Henry Chesbrough (Wed,) studied this question.