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One of the central questions in cryptology is how efficient generic constructions of cryptographic primitives can be. Gennaro, Gertner, Katz, and Trevisan SIAM J. of Compt. , 2005 studied the lower bounds of the number of invocations of a (trapdoor) one-way permutation in order to construct cryptographic schemes, e. g. , pseudorandom number generators, digital signatures, and public-key and symmetric-key encryption. Recently, quantum machines have been explored to construct_ cryptographic primitives other than quantum key distribution. This paper studies the efficiency of quantum_ black-box constructions of cryptographic primitives when the communications are classical_. Following Gennaro et al. , we give the lower bounds of the number of invocations of an underlying quantumly-computable quantum-one-way permutation when the quantum_ construction of pseudorandom number generator and symmetric-key encryption is weakly black-box. Our results show that the quantum black-box constructions of pseudorandom number generator and symmetric-key encryption do not improve the number of invocations of an underlying quantumly-computable quantum-one-way permutation.
Keita Xagawa (Tue,) studied this question.
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