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In order for an insurer to be liable for compensation in the first party injury insurance case, the accident must have occurred “while the insured was in possession, use, or control of the insured automobile, and (1) was caused by the operation of the insured automobile, or (2) was caused by the operation of the insured automobile if the insured was a passenger in the insured automobile.” The case concerned the recognition of the insurer's liability for compensation for bodily injury in an accident in which the driver of a small truck slipped and fell while climbing on the roof of the driver's cabin to cover the tarpaulin to protect the cargo from rain. The Supreme Court overturned the judgments of the first courts and appellate courts and ruled that the driver's injuries met the requirements for compensation for the first party injury insurance. In other words, even if a device is used in accordance with its intended use and is 'temporarily' used for a purpose other than its intended use, if the overall ‘use in accordance with the intended use' can be evaluated as the cause of the accident, it can be said to have broadly recognized the scope of insurance accidents by interpreting it as being included in the first party injury insurance stipulated in the auto insurance contract. Since 1999, when the definition of operation in Article 2 of the Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Act was amended, the Supreme Court has issued many judgments on the causation of operation, but there are many cases that do not provide clear standards, and in some cases, there are contradictory conclusions regarding the recognition of a substantial causal relationship between operation and an accident despite similar facts. Since the essential function of the Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Act is to guarantee compensation for damages to “victims of accidents caused by the operation of a motor vehicle” as a means of transportation, it is considered unreasonable to expand the concept of operational causation to an unlimited extent. The accident in the subject case was a simple safety accident caused by the driver's negligence. The Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Act defines the definition of operation as follows, The term ‘operation’ means using or managing motor vehicles according to their usage, regardless of whether they transport persons or objects. The ruling appears to be an overly broad interpretation of what it means to operate. Therefore I disagree with the reasons for the Supreme Court decision.
Gyu Seong Cho (Wed,) studied this question.