A mixed funding pattern: China's exercise of power within the United Nations

Abstract China's financial contributions to the United Nations have increased in tandem with its growing economic might. However, their composition differs from that of other large (Western) contributors, being predominantly made up of mandatory fees and to a much lesser degree of voluntary core and earmarked contributions. What types of power does China seek and exercise through these different funding modalities? This article uses the conceptual power framework developed by Barnett and Duvall to answer this question. We argue that China's UN funding strategy reflects a careful balance between its commitments as a ‘responsible great power’ contributing to multilateralism and its desire to expand its influence within the UN system. We suggest that China exercises compulsory and structural power through assessed contributions and acquires some limited institutional and structural power via voluntary core contributions, while its voluntary earmarked contributions relate, to varying degrees, to all four power types — compulsory, structural, institutional, and productive. We also discuss key reasons behind the limited nature of China's voluntary funding. Based on our analysis, we suggest that the overall increase in China's funding contributes to changes in China's favor but, so far, has not led to more substantive power shifts at the UN.