Key points are not available for this paper at this time.
Previous research on regional environmental pollution acknowledge that cross-level government cooperation plays an important role in controlling regional environmental pollution. However, the balance between local fiscal autonomy and governance costs has received little attention. To fill this research gap, this paper argues a model of local fiscal autonomy moderating the efficiency of environmental governance, which provides a basis for studying the effect of local fiscal autonomy on intergovernmental cooperative environmental governance. We collected the data set of the China Yangtze River Delta urban agglomeration, using Tobit regression model to evaluate the effect of local fiscal autonomy on cooperative arrangements and the moderating effect. The results show that higher local fiscal autonomy will positively affect vertical intervention actions and improve the efficiency of environmental governance. In addition, we found that more special funding for environmental projects will weaken the performance of horizontal cooperation on regional environmental governance.
Li et al. (Mon,) studied this question.