CFDI: Coordinated false data injection attack in active distribution network

Abstract The active distribution network (ADN) can obtain measurement data, estimate system states, and control distributed energy resources (DERs) and flexible loads to ensure voltage stability. However, the ADN is more vulnerable to cyber attacks due to the recent wave of digitization and automation efforts. In this article, false data injection (FDI) attacks are focused on and they are classified into two types, that is, type I attacks on measurement data and type II attacks on control commands. After studying the impact of these two FDI attacks on the ADN, a new threat is revealed called coordinated FDI attack, which can maximize the voltage deviation by coordinating type I and type II FDI attacks. From the attacker's perspective, the scheme of CFDI is proposed and an algorithm is developed to find the optimal attack strategy. The feasibility of CFDI attacks has been validated on a smart distribution testbed. Moreover, simulation results on an ADN benchmark have demonstrated that CFDI attacks could cause remarkable voltage deviation that may deteriorate the stability of the distribution network. Moreover, the impact of CFDI attacks is higher than pure type I or type II attacks. To mitigate the threat, some countermeasures against CFDI attacks are also proposed.