Achieving the construction sector’s dual carbon objectives necessitates scaling green energy adoption in new residential buildings. The current literature critically overlooks four unresolved problems: oversimplified penalty mechanisms, ignoring escalating regulatory costs; static subsidies misaligned with market maturity evolution; systematic exclusion of innovation feedback from energy suppliers; and underexplored behavioral evolution of building owners. This study establishes a government–suppliers–owners evolutionary game framework with dynamically calibrated policies, simulated using MATLAB multi-scenario analysis. Novel findings demonstrate: (1) A dual-threshold penalty effect where excessive fines diminish policy returns due to regulatory costs, requiring dynamic calibration distinct from fixed-penalty approaches; (2) Market-maturity-phased subsidies increasing owner adoption probability by 30% through staged progression; (3) Energy suppliers’ cost-reducing innovations as pivotal feedback drivers resolving coordination failures, overlooked in prior tripartite models; (4) Owners’ adoption motivation shifts from short-term economic incentives to environmentally driven decisions under policy guidance. The framework resolves these gaps through integrated dynamic mechanisms, providing policymakers with evidence-based regulatory thresholds, energy suppliers with cost-reduction targets, and academia with replicable modeling tools.
Yang et al. (Fri,) studied this question.
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